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II. Background

A. Prior Research
Differentially informed investors play a crucial role in many explanations of IPO underpricing. For example, in Rock's (1986) winner's curse model, informed investors only request stock in issues they know to be underpriced, thereby cre? ating an adverse selection problem for issuers that leads to underpricing, on av? erage, of IPOs. In Benveniste and Spindt's (1989) information-gathering model, informed investors provide valuable demand and pricing feedback to underwrit? ers, and underpricing, on average, compensates for the value of this information, probability that, if the issue is overpriced, they will face the consequent winner's curse. More detail on the cost structure and institutional arrangements in Singapore IPOs is provided in Section II.B.
as well as the cost of participating in overpriced issues. While distinguishing be? tween the role of these (and other) models requires consideration of the prevailing institutional setting, Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) Hanley and Wilhelm interpret their evidence to imply that informed investors are forced by underwriters to take shares in overpriced issues. It is also plausible that informed investors take more reliably overpriced issues because of unob? servable "scaling back" via the pre-selling process or a bias in rationing relative to uninformed investors. More generally, it is even possible that results such as those reported by Hanley and Wilhelm may simply reflect an absence of supe? rior information among institutional investors, so that they cannot be expected to discriminate between overpriced and underpriced issues. Another possible expla? nation for the result reported by Hanley and Wilhelm is that the regression masks a statistically significant institutional investor coefficient due to institutions be? ing more prominent in larger underpriced issues, because each IPO is equally weighted. ii) Disclosure of the rationing process is provided routinely, allowing the researcher to determine, conditional on various application strategies, the ex post probability of success.
iii) Sufficient post-issue disclosure is frequently made to allow estimation of the demand schedule, allowing the researcher to observe the application pool for an issue, the rationing process used in the issue, and the actual allocation distribution for the issue.3
3 Some corporate disclosures made in Singapore IPOs allow the researcher to estimate the prob? ability of receiving an allocation conditional on the number of shares applied for, but do not give sufficient details to allow the demand schedule to be reconstructed. For example, a disclosure might indicate that one in 10 investors who applied for 1,000 shares were randomly selected as success-Previous Singapore research has utilized the disclosures in i) and ii). Koh and Walter (1989) 1992, and for the 91 firms for which sufficient data are disclosed to allow the application and allocation proportions for the issue to be reconstructed (the included firms), and for the remaining 41 firms for which application and allocation proportions cannot be reconstructed (the excluded firms).
a Underpricing = The last sale on the first day of listing minus the subscription price, divided by the subscription price, multiplied by 100 (%). Over-subscription = The multiple by which total applications exceed available shares (times).
Age of the firm = Length of prior operating history of the firms (years). Retained ownership = Proportion of the equity retained by previous owners (%). Listing lag = Time between prospectus registration and exchange listing (days).
Log of issue size = Natural log of equity issue size * (Singapore $ millions). Log of total assets = Natural log of total assets after initial equity issue * (Singapore $ millions). 
III. Data and Empirical Results
A. Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use a combined sample of IPOs previously studied by, and described in, ii) Six IPOs were under-subscribed and they did not provide sufficient details to allow demand to be determined.6
iii) A further 13 IPOs were over-subscribed but the details of the application patterns cannot be estimated from the (less complete) information disclosed.7 Nine of these come from the earlier IPOs studied by Koh and Walter (1989 An analysis of the IPOs plotted in Figure 1 shows that the range of appli?
cation proportions differs considerably from the allocation proportions. Large investors had a minimum demand of zero (as too did medium investors for one issue that was underpriced by significantly less than the average underpricing for the sample) and a maximum demand of 97.55% (the issue was the most heavily over-subscribed IPO and it was the most underpriced; small investors were crowded out of this particular issue and accounted for only 1.22% of the total ap? plication pool for the issue, though they were allocated 20.2% ofthe shares). We examine these matters in greater detail in subsequent regression analysis, but point out that substantial differences in application and allocation proportions mean that 
B. Evidence on Application and Allocation Schedules as Explanations of Initial Underpricing
This section investigates the ability of application and allocation schedules to explain variations in initial underpricing. We are particularly interested in whether different inferences flow from looking at the allocation decisions of issuers, com? pared to the application patterns of investors, across various application size cat? egories. As we detail below, the proportions applied for by investors are substantially different from the proportions allocated to those investors. Table 3 reports results for eight regressions in which either the application Table 3 The results in Table 3 show that relative demand by large investors is significantly positively associated with underpricing, consistent with large investors being bet? ter informed.9 Indeed, demand by the largest investors is sufficient to reduce the proportional applications and allocations in the three smaller investor categories, 9We repeated the regressions in Table 3 A test similar to Table 3 using underpricing, rather than initial profits as the dependant variable, our results are similar to, though somewhat weaker than, those reported in Table 3 . Koh and Walter (1989) report that the Spearman rank correlation coefficient between the over-subscription level and underpricing in their sample (n = 66) is 0.951, which is significant at the 1% level. Lee, Taylor, and Walter (1996b) report results for a univariate regression of over-subscription on underpricing (n = 128), which is also significant at the 1% level. Table 4 10White's f-statistic is significant at 5% in Table 4 whereas the raw f-statistic is 3.931. This result is influenced by one extreme observation caused by the most heavily over-subscribed (and most under? priced) issue. White's f-statistic increases to 2.035 (significant at 1%) when this outlier is removed.
proportion (within four investor size categories) or the allocation proportion (for the same four investor size categories) is regressed on initial profit. Initial profit is calculated as initial underpricing multiplied by the size ofthe issue (in millions of Singapore dollars). The regression equation for
12The standard error of the estimate for the underpricing coefficient on this regression is 32.4. Thus, it is clear that some of the least underpriced IPOs still attract significant informed demand. White's (1980) adjusted f-statistics were also calculated. These are consistent with the reported results, except that the f-statistic for large investor demand expansion for the most underpriced issues is significant at 5%, rather than at 1%. The weaker result is caused by one extreme observation. We also estimated these regressions using the allocation proportions (rather than the over-subscription levels or application proportions used in Table 4) Table 4 are consistent with Rock's model, which predicts that informed demand expansion in underpriced issues crowds out other investors. More generally, other models (e.g., Welch's (1992) cascade theory) of underpricing also require that demand expands in response to price decreases. Table 5 further explores the issue of demand expansion. Here, our concern is to determine the extent to which applications by (and allocations to) investors in each of the four size categories are explained by the level of over-subscription. Table 5 In sharp contrast, all six coefficients for the three smaller investor categories are significantly negative. 
It is clearly evident in the
IV. Conclusions
Using confidential allocation data for a limited number of U.S. IPOs, Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) show that institutional (i.e., informed) investors receive approximately the same proportions of shares in overpriced and underpriced issues. They interpret this result as support for Benveniste and Spindt's (1989) explanation of IPO underpricing, which is premised on discriminatory behavior by U.S. underwriters, and reject the winner's curse explanation proposed by Rock (1986) . This conclusion, however, is subject to the criticism that the final allocation of IPO shares may look very different from the underlying demand for the shares.
Unfortunately, this criticism cannot be evaluated using U.S.-sourced data, for at least two reasons. First, application and allocation data will likely be very similar if, in fact, underwriters' discriminatory allocation powers dampen under? lying (i.e., unconstrained) demand. Second, even if this were not the case, such application data are simply not available to researchers in the U.S.; however, IPOs made on the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES) routinely provide details of how over-subscribed issues are rationed. Frequently, the disclosure is sufficiently de? tailed to allow the application schedule for an IPO to be reconstructed. arising from an investigation of investors' application strategies. We show that larger investors are more informed in that they apply for relatively more of the un? derpriced issues. Our results are consistent with the predictions of Rock's (1986) theory of why, in equilibrium, IPOs are underpriced. We note that a direct test of the uninformed investor equilibrium conditions in Rock's model requires that the probability of receiving an allocation in IPOs can be estimated. These data are routinely reported for IPOs made on the SES. We show that, in underpriced
